The Impact of Common Currencies on Financial Markets: A Literature Review and Evidence from the Euro Area by Liliane Karlinger
Bank of Canada Banque du CanadaWorking Paper 2002-35 / Document de travail 2002-35The Impact of Common Currencies on Financial
Markets: A Literature Review and Evidence
from the Euro Area
by
Liliane Karlinger
ISSN 1192-5434
Printed in Canada on recycled paper
Bank of Canada Working Paper 2002-35
November 2002The Impact of Common Currencies on Financial
Markets: A Literature Review and Evidence
from the Euro Area
by
Liliane Karlinger
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
Via dei Roccettini 9
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy
Liliane.Karlinger@iue.itThe views expressed in this paper are those of the author.
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.

iii
Contents
Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Abstract/Résumé. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. The Welfare Effects of Common Currencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1 International risk-sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2 Financial market integration and its impact on growth—theory
and evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Public policy aspects of financial integration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. EMU and European Financial Markets—The Experience of
the First Three Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 Direct effects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Indirect effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. Lessons for Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
iv
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Jeannine Bailliu, Denise Côté, Eiji Fujii, Doug Hostland, Robert Lafrance, James
Powell, and Larry Schembri for helpful comments and suggestions. Moreover, I wish to thank the
International Department at the Bank of Canada for their hospitality and support during my stay at
the Bank.
vAbstract
This paper reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of common
currencies on financial markets and evaluates the first three years of experience with Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU). If we assume that multiple currencies prevent national financial
markets from integrating, a currency union can improve welfare by (i) encouraging international
risk diversion through private portfolio diversification, and (ii) improving growth performance by
allowing for riskier, higher-quality, more long-run investment. EMU has encouraged integration
among the still fairly fragmented European financial markets both directly and indirectly. When
applying the European experience to a potential North American monetary union, one should
consider that the U.S. and Canadian financial markets are already more integrated than the
European ones, and thus the potential gains in terms of greater financial market integration from a
common currency in North America may be more moderate than in Europe.
JEL classification: E44, F21, F36, G15
Bank classification: Exchange rate regimes; Financial markets
Résumé
L’auteure examine la littérature théorique et empirique consacrée à l’incidence des monnaies
communes sur les marchés financiers et dresse le bilan des trois premières années de l’Union
économique et monétaire (UEM) européenne. Si l’on suppose que l’existence de plusieurs devises
fait obstacle à l’intégration des marchés financiers nationaux, alors une union monétaire peut
améliorer le bien-être i) en encourageant la dilution du risque international par la diversification
des portefeuilles du secteur privé et ii) en permettant des investissements à plus haut risque, de
qualité supérieure et à plus long terme qui stimuleront la croissance. L’UEM a favorisé
directement et indirectement l’intégration de marchés financiers européens encore passablement
fragmentés. Au moment d’appliquer les leçons tirées de l’expérience européenne au contexte
nord-américain, on ne doit pas oublier que les marchés financiers américains et canadiens sont
déjà plus intégrés que les marchés européens. En conséquence, les gains d’intégration à attendre
de l’adoption d’une monnaie commune en Amérique du Nord pourraient être plus modestes qu’en
Europe.
Classification JEL : E44, F21, F36, G15
Classification de la Banque : Régimes de taux de change; Marchés financiers

11. Introduction
Recent economic developments in Europe, particularly the implementation of European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), have stimulated researchers to reinvestigate the merits
and problems of monetary unions. Few of their papers explicitly analyze the impact of common
currencies on financial markets and the implied welfare effects.
This paper highlights this aspect of monetary union by reviewing both the theoretical and
empirical literature on the subject. Moreover, now that EMU is in its fourth year, some evidence is
available regarding the euro’s impact on euro-area financial markets, and those findings can be
compared with theoretical predictions.
Recent studies (e.g., Frankel and Rose 2000) indicate that important welfare gains for Canada
may be associated with a North American monetary union (NAMU). Those studies have
stimulated public as well as scientific discussion (e.g., Chriszt 2000, and Alesina and Barro 2002).
This paper contributes to that discussion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the main macroeconomic arguments
regarding the impact of common currencies on financial markets. In section 2.1, I focus on
international risk-sharing through private capital markets, and in section 2.2 I examine the growth
effects of financial market integration. In section 2.3, I discuss the public policy implications of
financial integration, regarding systemic risk and monetary transmission mechanisms.
Section 3 describes the development of European financial markets over the first three years of
EMU. First, I investigate the direct, or mechanical, effects of EMU, such as the cost of business
adjusting to the new currency, the standardization in pricing, the shrinking of the foreign
exchange market, the elimination of intra-European currency risk, and the homogenization of the
bond market (section 3.1). I then evaluate the indirect effects that EMU has had on European
financial markets. I focus on cross-country transaction costs within the euro area and EMU’s
impact on the further integration of European bond and equity markets and the banking sector,
and investigate the euro’s role as an international transaction and reserve currency (section 3.2).
In section 4, I enquire as to what can be inferred from the European experience for North
America. The growing economic integration in North America, as exemplified by the North
American Free Trade Agreement, has led some observers to discuss the potential merits of a
monetary union among the United States, Canada, and possibly Mexico (for instance, Buiter
1999, Laidler 1999, McCallum 1999, Murray 1999, Courchene and Harris 2000, and Macklem et
al. 2000). Section 5 offers some conclusions.
22. The Welfare Effects of Common Currencies
In this section, I investigate various theoretical arguments pertaining to the welfare effects of a
monetary union. The more “mechanical” effects of common currencies (e.g., transactions-cost
savings on currency conversion, the loss of foreign exchange trade, or the liquidity effect reducing
the transactions costs of buying and selling financial assets) are specific to each currency-union
project, and they are described in more detail in section 3, which outlines the first experience of
European financial markets under EMU.
Here, I focus on the two main principles regarding the long-run macroeconomic implications of
monetary union operating through financial markets. The underlying assumption is that multiple
currencies prevent national financial markets from integrating more deeply, thus depriving agents
of the potential benefits of financial market integration.
First, I examine the benefits of risk-sharing through asset markets, whereby risk-averse agents can
insure against income shocks by diversifying their portfolio across the whole unified currency
area, rather than being restricted to the (smaller) national asset markets.1 Second, I examine the
theory and empirical evidence of the allegedly positive link between financial market integration
and growth, and give some estimates of the potential growth effects of EMU.
2.1 International risk-sharing
2.1.1 The theory of interregional and international risk-sharing
It is a well-known result of general-equilibrium theory that if asset markets are complete, risk-
averse individuals can and will fully insure against consumption fluctuations across states. In an
environment that has neutral money and multiple currencies, this implies that the choice of an
exchange rate regime will not have any impact on social welfare (Helpman 1981, Kareken and
Wallace 1982, Lucas 1982).
In practice, however, asset markets will be incomplete and risk cannot be completely hedged, in
particular at the more aggregate level, and so the exchange rate regime may indeed matter. There
1. Note, however, that the availability of assets denominated in different currencies can represent a source
of diversification in itself. When fluctuations in the value of money reflect real economic shocks, some
degree of exchange rate variability is beneficial, since it increases the insurance opportunities available
through trade in nominal assets (see Helpman and Razin 1982). Thus, switching from a monetary regime
with national central banks to a currency union increases welfare when the gain from eliminating excess
monetary volatility exceeds the cost of reducing the variety of financial instruments in the economy
(Neumeyer 1998).
3are two approaches to considering the impact of the exchange rate in the context of region-specific
shocks hitting the economy.
First, flexible exchange rates may substitute for other adjustment mechanisms (like price and
wage adjustments or central fiscal transfers) if the latter are not available. This important insight,
by Mundell (1961), underlies most of what has become known as the Theory of Optimum
Currency Areas.
What is perhaps less known is that, several years later, Mundell presented a new view of common
currencies as a means of smoothing shocks by better reserve pooling and portfolio diversification.
According to this approach, which has recently been “rediscovered” by McKinnon (2000),
countries sharing a single currency can mitigate the effects of asymmetric shocks among
themselves by diversifying their income source and adjusting their wealth portfolio.
The international diversification of income source can operate through income insurance when
residents of a country hold claims to dividends, interests, and rental revenue in other countries.
Such ex-ante insurance allows the smoothing of both temporary and permanent shocks as long as
output is imperfectly correlated.
A country’s residents can adjust their wealth portfolio in response to income fluctuations by
buying and selling assets and borrowing and lending on international credit markets. Such ex-post
adjustment allows the smoothing of transitory shocks (Mongelli 2002, 13, and references therein).
By emphasizing the foreign exchange market’s forward-looking nature, Mundell (1973) shows
how future exchange rate uncertainty could disrupt the capital market by inhibiting international
portfolio diversification and risk-sharing.2 As McKinnon (1996) demonstrates, the gains from
proper risk-sharing through a common currency should show up as a net reduction in risk premia
on interest rates for the system as a whole.
The possibility of international risk-sharing implies that similarity of shocks is not a strict
prerequisite for sharing a single currency if all members of the currency area are financially
integrated and hold claims on each others’ output. This point has important implications for a
debate about the size of a single currency area. A common currency could be shared by countries
2. Moreover, under a flexible exchange rate regime, full risk-sharing need not be welfare-improving per
se. As Sutherland (2002) shows in a two-country model with sticky prices, the welfare level achieved
in the risk-sharing case is unambiguously higher than the welfare level in the autarky case only when
monetary policy is coordinated (which is of course true by default under a monetary union). If it is not
coordinated (as may be the case with flexible exchange rates), then the spillover effects generated by
the existence of integrated financial markets can be so strong that, for some parameter combinations,
autarky yields higher welfare than risk-sharing.
4subject to idiosyncratic shocks as long as they can help “insure” one another through private
financial markets (Mongelli 2002).
2.1.2 Evidence of risk-sharing through capital markets in Europe
Since Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1991) published their findings about the (surprisingly) high
stabilization effects of the U.S. federal budget, the empirical literature on risk-sharing has focused
on the role of net transfers through central governments.
The issue of decentralized risk-sharing through private markets has received much less attention.
In an early attempt to quantify the degree of risk-sharing provided by private capital markets for
both the United States and Europe, Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993) find that capital flows among
regions are significantly larger than those across countries, and private markets still provide a
relatively limited degree of insurance against regional fluctuations.
Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) try to evaluate the importance of decentralized
mechanisms in relation to public aid in attenuating regional shocks for the United States. They
identify two channels of risk-sharing: the insurance channel (holding of claims against the output
of other regions) and the credit channel (borrowing from other regions). Their main conclusion is
that, for the United States, insurance is far more important than credit for smoothing regional
shocks, and credit itself is nearly twice as important as net transfers from the central government.
Melitz and Zumer (1999) revise the method developed by Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996),
and apply it to interregional risk-sharing in the United States and Canada as well as international
risk-sharing within the European Union (EU). For the United States, Melitz and Zumer (1999)
qualify the results of Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996), claiming that insurance and credit
contribute evenly to shock smoothing. They also show that interregional risk-sharing in Canada
closely resembles that in the United States.
Moreover, Melitz and Zumer (1999) find that idiosyncratic shocks are larger, and smoothing
lower, among EU countries than among states in the United States or provinces in Canada. More
than half of the smoothing comes from risk-sharing, and all of this risk-sharing concerns
insurance (diversified property holding) rather than credit.
As a methodological innovation, Melitz and Zumer (1999) distinguish between insurance through
income flows and through depreciation (these two channels are summarized as “insurance” in
Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha 1996), and find that capital gains and losses are of much greater
importance for intra-EU risk-sharing than are income flows. Moreover, openness seems to lead to
more cross-ownership of resources, thus promoting risk-sharing via insurance relative to credit.
5Melitz and Zumer (1999) also note that 75 to 80 per cent of idiosyncratic output shocks go
unsmoothed in EU countries, which they interpret as an indication that the sacrifice associated
with EMU was exaggerated by most economists.3 Instead, EMU should foster international risk-
sharing by increasing intra-EMU trade and financial integration (which favours the holding of
property claims across borders and the availability of credit from other member countries).
Antia, Djoudad, and St-Amant (1999) apply the method developed by Asdrubali, Sørensen, and
Yosha (1996) to international risk-sharing between the United States and Canada. They also find
significant differences between interregional and international risk-sharing. While only 37 per
cent of shocks go unsmoothed within Canada, as much as 48 per cent of international shocks are
not absorbed between Canada and the United States. Moreover, although the insurance and credit
channels are almost equally important within Canada, international risk-sharing between Canada
and the United States takes place mainly through the credit channel.
Table 1 summarizes the main findings of Melitz and Zumer (1999) and Antia, Djoudad, and
St-Amant (1999), thus allowing the numbers for intra-EU risk-sharing to be compared with those
for international risk-sharing between the United States and Canada. We see that the fraction of
unsmoothed shocks is much lower between the United States and Canada than within the EU
(52 per cent versus 24 per cent). In fact, total interregional risk smoothing through private
channels (i.e., insurance plus credit) within the United States and Canada is of about the same
order of magnitude (approximately 50 per cent) as total international risk smoothing between
these two countries (in the latter, there is of course no role for government transfers).
Another interesting difference is that while the bulk of smoothing within the EU takes place
through capital gains and losses, the dominant channel between Canada and the United States
seems to be borrowing and lending, which plays virtually no role in the EU.
3. Recall that, for virtually all of the 1960–94 time period that Melitz and Zumer (1999) use in their
analysis, European currencies were fixed or quasi-fixed, first through the Bretton Woods system from
1960 to 1973, and then through the “snake” and the ERM thereafter. Consequently, during this period
the role of monetary policy in smoothing shocks was limited.
62.2 Financial market integration and its impact on growth—theory
and evidence
By eliminating exchange risk and increasing transparency, EMU is thought to contribute to
ongoing financial market integration in Europe. Of course, this process is also driven by other
important factors, like the Internal Market Programme4 and financial reforms at the national level.
Financial integration has been assigned a high priority on the EU economic reform agenda
adopted by the Lisbon European Council in 2000 and reaffirmed by the Stockholm European
Council in 2001. To find an economic motivation for proceeding with EU financial integration, I
will examine the theoretical and empirical evidence that may support the existence of a link
between financial development and economic performance.
Table 1: Components of Risk-Sharing
Percentage of regional shocks absorbed through central government transfers, cross-border
property claims (“the insurance channel”), interregional borrowing and lending (“the credit
channel”), and going unsmoothed.
Interregional Government Insurance Credit Unsmoothed
U.S. 1964–90* 0.13 (7.8) 0.24 (7.6) 0.24 (6.8) 0.39
Canada 1962–94* 0.10 (6.2) 0.23 (5.79) 0.30 (7.65) 0.37
Percentage of national shocks absorbed through cross-border property claims (subdivided into
income flows and depreciation), international borrowing and lending (“the credit channel”), and
going unsmoothed. (Note that no international government transfers are taking place.)
International Income flows Capital gains/losses Credit Unsmoothed
EU15 1960–94* 0.08 (4.77) 0.13 (6.22) 0.02 (0.71) 0.77
U.S.-Canada
1969–95**
0.00 (0.46) -0.12 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00) 0.48
* Source: Melitz and Zumer (1999, 39–45); numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
** Source: Antia, Djoudad, and St-Amant (1999, 16); numbers in brackets are p values.
4. Adopted in 1986, the Single European Act envisaged the completion of the Internal Market
Programme of the European Community (EC) by 1992. This programme required the elimination of
all remaining barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour. Based on the
principle of non-discrimination, the legislative measures adopted include the prohibition of
discriminatory internal taxation, quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect
obstructing the free movement of goods, rules governing the rights of entry and residence of EC
citizens across other member countries, mutual recognition of qualifications and the single-licence
principle, and the liberalization of capital movements.
72.2.1 The finance–growth nexus
The early 1990s saw a new strand of literature emerging that tried to explain the channels through
which an efficient financial system can influence the two fundamental sources of economic
growth: capital accumulation and technical progress.
The design of the financial system is thought to improve investment performance in the following
three ways5:
(i) Enhanced quality of investment: Financial intermediaries may have more expertise and
resources to devote to the evaluation and selection of projects, thus raising the profitability of
investment (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990).
(ii) More long-term projects: A liquid financial market allows for a larger proportion of savings
to be invested in projects of a longer duration, which are typically more productive than
shorter-term projects (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).
(iii) Portfolio diversification: If risk-averse savers can share risks through the financial system,
they may be willing to allocate a higher fraction of savings to riskier projects, which stimu-
lates specialization and thus benefits the economy’s division of labour and growth (Saint-Paul
1992, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha 2001).
Thus, efficient financial markets can improve investment performance not only by increasing the
amount of available capital (through a reduction in transactions costs) but by raising their average
productivity.
Thiel (2001) conducts a comprehensive survey of the available empirical evidence on the above-
described finance-growth link. While there seems to be consensus about a strong impact of
financial development on growth for developing countries (see Bailliu 2000), the issue for
industrial countries remains controversial.
For a sample of 22 industrial countries, Table 2 shows the significance of selected financial
variables in ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions on selected economic output indicators,
controlling for the impact of the gross domestic product (GDP) level and employment growth. For
6 out of the 15 possible combinations, the calculations yield a significantly positive coefficient,
which is more than one would expect if the impact of finance on growth were purely accidental.
Still, the fact that a few regressions reveal a negative relation casts some doubts on the robustness
of evidence derived at the aggregate level. Thus, while analysis at the aggregate level remains
inconclusive, studies at the firm level yield relatively strong support for the growth-enhancing
effect of finance (see Thiel 2001, and references therein).
5. See Pagano (1993) and Levine (1997) for extensive surveys of the theory of the finance-growth link.
8It also seems that selection and monitoring of investment is more important for industrial
economies than the other transmission channels (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000). Moreover,
there is no evidence that market-based systems are constantly superior to bank-based systems
(Carlin and Mayer 1999, Beck and Levine 2002, and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2000).
Indeed, the effectiveness of financial structures appears to depend more on completeness and
adaptability in the financial system.
2.2.2 Financial integration in the EU
In this section, I evaluate the degree of financial integration in the euro area. There are two ways
to test for financial market integration: first, the price convergence of financial assets can be
assessed (the “arbitrage” test, or “law-of-one-price” test), and second, the intensity of cross-
border financial flows can be measured (the “quantity” test), which includes testing for the
independence of domestic investment from domestic savings (the “Feldstein-Horioka” test)
(Mongelli 2002, 20 f.).
For the first approach, the European Commission (2001)6 finds that the (remaining) spreads of
government bond yields are better explained by differences in risk and liquidity, and hence do not
appear to be segmented by national borders.7 The report also finds that the dispersion of retail
Table 2: Significance of Financial Variables in Cross-Country Regressions
With independent variables (i-iv) on dependent variables (A-E), controlling for GDP level and employment growth,
22 industrial countries*.
(i) Private credit/
GDP
(ii) Stock market
capitalization/
GDP
(iii) Total financing
(i) + (ii)
(iv) Relative
importance of
stock markets
(A) GDP growth Negative, ns Positive, ** Positive, ns Positive, **
(B) TFP growth Positive, ns Positive, ns Positive, ** Positive, **
(C) Real investment
growth
Positive, ns Positive, * Positive, * Positive, ns
(D) Investment/GDP Positive, ** Negative, ns Positive, ns Negative, ns
(E) Returns on capital Negative, ns Positive, * Negative, ns Positive, **
Source: Thiel (2001, 25 and 33).
* The countries are EU member states, plus the United States, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Australia, and
New Zealand. ** denotes 5 (1) per cent significance, “ns” denotes “not significant at 5 per cent”. Total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) growth (B) is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function. Variable (iv) is computed as stock
market capitalization divided by private credit.
6. This is an annual report on the economic situation and developments in the EU, published by the
European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs as part of their series
of reports, studies, and analyses edited under the heading “European Economy.”
7. For more details on the persistence of public bond yield spreads in the euro area, see section 3.2.
9bank interest rates has declined, indicating a growing integration of retail banking markets in the
euro area.
Moreover, the European Commission (2001) reports that in all euro-area stock markets, except for
the Dutch, the explanatory power of foreign returns is indeed higher after implementation of the
EMU than before, with a 57 per cent increase, on average, in the sensitivity to cross-border
determinants of stock prices.
Still, caution is advised when trying to attribute the progress in integration to the EMU alone. It
seems that some significant integration had already taken place prior to the EMU, as Hardouvelis,
Malliaropulos, and Priestley (1999) document. They find that equity market integration in the
second half of the 1990s reduced the costs of capital by around 2 per cent, mainly as a result of the
reduction in the country-specific risk component.
The most prominent test for the macroeconomic implications of financial market integration
originates from the seminal article by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), who argue that, for a closed
economy, the balance of payments is zero by definition, and that, consequently, investment and
savings are equal. Hence, in a regression of the investment share, the coefficient of the saving
share, , should be 1 for a closed economy, while in an open economy this coefficient will be
smaller than one, with greater international financial integration reducing it further.8
Table 3 shows the results of a recent analysis along the lines of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) for
the 15 EU countries as well as a control panel consisting of the United States, Canada, Japan,
Switzerland, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand. For each country, the saving and investment
ratios of one decade were averaged, and then an OLS regression of the investment ratio on the
savings ratio was performed, using the 15 observations for the EU (and the seven observations for
the control group) to generate an estimate of .
The results show that this coefficient has gradually declined since the 1960s, although this has
been an international trend, as the coefficient for the control panel indicates. Still, for the period
covering 1996–2000, this coefficient of the EU estimate is not significantly different from zero for
the first time.9 Recall, however, that the small sample sizes imply very limited degrees of
freedom.
8. Feldstein and Horioka’s (1980) results led to a widespread debate on their method (see, for instance,
Tesar 1991 and Hussein 1998) and the interpretation of their results (Frankel, Dooley, and Mathieson
1986, Baxter and Crucini 1993, Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995, and Coakley and Kulasi 1997).
9. This does not imply, however, that what is observed for 1996–2000 is actually the “euro effect.”
Besides, the sample covers all member countries of the EU, not just the EMU participants;
nonetheless, as Thiel (2001, 8) shows, results do not differ if the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
Denmark (the three EU countries that are not participating in EMU) are excluded from the sample.
α
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102.2.3 Potential welfare gains of financial integration in the EU
In the late 1980s, the EC Commission, the executive body of the EU, tasked a research team to
estimate the economic benefits of a completed single market (see Emerson et al. 1988).10 Many
independent economic experts, consultants, and research institutions contributed to this project,
with support from the EC Commission’s departments.
One aim of this project was to quantify the reduction in the cost of financial services associated
with financial integration in the EC and the impact that this could have on the economy as a
whole. The team was well aware of how difficult and questionable it is to dissociate the probable
impact of the EC measures to liberalize financial markets from other internal or external
influences that could work in the same direction (Servais 1991).
The team estimated the prices of a series of representative financial products before and after the
abolition of legislative barriers, particularly exchange controls. Their analysis was based entirely
on the measures of the Internal Market Programme, and therefore it did not assume a common
currency. Their main findings can be summarized as follows:
Table 3: Feldstein-Horioka Test of Financial Market Integration
Cross-country OLS regression: I/Y = constant + (S/Y)
Sample coverage The EU(15 member states)
Control panel
1960s 0.80 (0.060) 0.91 (0.053)
1970s 0.67 (0.051) 0.83 (0.077)
1980s 0.61 (0.070) 0.50 (0.051)
1990s 0.41 (0.068) 0.36 (0.049)
1996–2000 0.18 (0.108) 0.20 (0.067)
Source: The European Commission (2001, 158); numbers in brackets are not explained.
10. Recall that, at the time, the EC had only 12 members, and the Internal Market Programme was the
most important project on the economic policy agenda.
α∗
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11• Potential price reductions in financial services11 for the eight EC countries examined would
be as high as 10 per cent, on average, implying a permanent cost reduction for the economy of
about 0.7 per cent of GDP.
• The extent of the price reduction would vary substantially between countries. The sharpest fall
was expected for Spain (21 per cent), followed by Italy, France, Belgium, and Germany (with
14, 12, 11, and 10 per cent, respectively), while Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands would appear in the lowest category (with 8, 7, and 4 per cent, respectively).
These differences in price-reduction potential were attributed to discrepancies between the
countries in terms of economic structure, competition, and regulatory environment. The major
part of these reductions was expected to be realized in the retail banking sector, which has
traditionally been less competitive than the wholesale banking sector.
• These direct cost reductions would induce dynamic efficiency gains through the lower cost of
capital, promoting productive investment. The effects are estimated to increase EC GDP by
almost 1.5 per cent.
Of course, these figures should be viewed with caution, given the methodological difficulties,
heterogeneous nature of the data, and uncertainty about a number of dynamic factors potentially
induced by the Internal Market Programme.
As will be described in more detail in section 3, the Single Market Programme did not fully
integrate European financial markets as expected. EMU was supposed to provide further stimulus
to financial market integration.
It is interesting to compare the results of this early attempt to quantify the welfare effects with a
new study commissioned by the European Financial Round Table, the so-called Gyllenhammer
Report (quoted in Economic and Financial Committee 2002, 12) which, based on the full
implementation of EMU, suggested in February 2002 that:
(i) the potential for higher growth through financial integration could be up to 0.5 to 0.7 per cent
per year, or 43 billion euros (in 2000 prices) added annually to EU GDP, and
(ii) a higher rate of return as a result of financial integration, by, for example, 1 percentage point,
for investments could lower household pension contributions by as much as 5 percentage
points.
11. The financial services surveyed were banking services (consumer credit cards, mortgages, letters of
credit, foreign exchange drafts, travellers cheques, commercial loans), insurance services (life
insurance, home insurance, motor insurance, commercial fire and theft, public liability coverage), and
brokerage services (private equity transactions, private gilt transactions, institutional equity
transactions, institutional gilt transactions).
12Both studies agree on the order of magnitude of the welfare potential, although one takes EMU
into account, while the other does not, suggesting that EMU is not crucial in delivering these gains
from integration.
2.3 Public policy aspects of financial integration
2.3.1 Financial stability and systemic risk
Financial market integration has important implications for financial stability and, as far as EMU
is concerned, is associated with considerable institutional challenges. Financial crises can be
defined as “episodes of financial market volatility marked by significant problems of illiquidity
and insolvency of financial market participants and/or by official intervention to contain such
consequences” (Bordo et al. 2001)
As documented by Bordo et al. (2001), banking and currency crises have become more frequent
in recent decades (but not more severe), which suggests that the globalization of financial flows,
trade, and investment has increased the scope for spillovers from country to country. To the extent
that a currency union promotes financial integration, it could contribute towards strengthening or
weakening of the domestic financial system.
To understand whether EMU will enhance or reduce financial stability, its impact on the causes,
nature, and consequences of future financial crises must be examined. Overall, EMU is expected
to foster financial stability for two reasons. First, the introduction of the euro eliminates the
possibility of exchange rate adjustments or collapses among the euro countries. Second, financial
integration will encourage cross-border diversification of portfolios, thus allowing for better risk
spreading.
While these effects will be of the first order, second-order effects can operate in the other
direction. First, to the extent that financial integration leads to increased cross-border activities not
only within the euro area, but also between the euro area and third countries, which implies
important foreign currency exposures, the exchange rate risk as a potential cause of banking crises
is not entirely eliminated (see the European Commission 2001).
Second, EMU may intensify competition among financial institutions, which may induce
individual institutions to restore profit margins by accepting a higher risk exposure (compare with
section 3.2.4). Thus, while financial integration may change the nature of risks to the financial
system, it makes the job of bank supervisors more difficult.
13When the monetary policy functions were transferred from the national central banks to the
European Central Bank (ECB), the supervisory authority was left at the national level. This
diffuse system may make it harder to monitor the banking system’s exposure to the risk created by
single creditors borrowing from different parts of the integrated market. Along with the
persistence of differences in both supervisory practices and capital standards among member
nations, this puts a large premium on the efficient exchange of information (McCauley and White
1997).
The institutional set-up affects both the incentives for sound banking and the options for
managing banking problems when they occur. While the existing system of deposit insurance may
be associated with incentive problems, the “constructive ambiguity” of the Maastricht Treaty,
which leaves the “lender-of-last-resort” issue unresolved, and the fact that EU competition
policies discourage state bailouts, provide the right incentives (Prati and Schinasi 1997).
2.3.2 Homogenization of transmission mechanisms
Another possible implication that financial market integration has for public policy is the
homogenization of transmission mechanisms in the euro area, which will facilitate monetary
policy-making in general and crises management in particular.
McCauley and White (1997) note that differences in financial structure imply that common short-
term interest rate changes will have different effects in different national jurisdictions within the
same currency area. These differences are expected to diminish and eventually vanish as financial
integration proceeds.
Recent evidence seems to indicate that the first effects are already visible.12 De Bondt (2002)
analyzes the retail bank interest rate pass-through13 for the euro area and finds evidence for an
acceleration of the pass-through. His estimation results suggest that the proportion of the pass-
through of changes in market interest rates to bank deposit and lending rates within one month is
at its highest around 50 per cent. The interest rate pass-through is higher in the long term and,
notably for bank lending rates, close to 100 per cent. Moreover, a cointegration relation exists
between retail bank and comparable market interest rates. The subsample results, however, are
supportive of a quicker pass-through process since the introduction of the euro.
12. See section 3 for a more detailed account of the homogenization of financial assets and the structures
and rules governing financial markets and banking in Europe.
13. Defined as the adjustment of retail bank interest rates to changes in the money market interest rate.
14Suardi (2001), comparing the literature on economic and financial structures across countries,
investigates how each channel of transmission may work differently in different countries, and
how this is being changed by the introduction of the euro. Suardi’s analysis indicates that the
structural differences across the six euro-area countries considered (Belgium, Germany, Spain,
France, Italy, and the Netherlands) are of a lesser scale than those between them and the United
Kingdom or Sweden.
It seems likely that asymmetries in monetary transmission within the euro area could decrease
over time as financial structures become more similar and economic agents adjust their behaviour
to the new policy environment. In spite of the completion of the Single Market and the
introduction of the euro, however, countries will continue to differ along many important
dimensions—including, for instance, production structures, housing markets, labour markets, and
legal systems—implying that a degree of heterogeneity in monetary transmission will be a
persistent feature of the euro area.
3. EMU and European Financial Markets—The Experience of the
First Three Years
In this section, I examine the available evidence on the European financial markets’ three years of
experience with EMU.
Before the euro was introduced, the framework for discussing this issue was defined by seminal
International Monetary Fund (IMF) working papers by Prati and Schinasi (1997) and McCauley
and White (1997). Their work was complemented and extended by Danthine, Giavazzi, and von
Thadden (2000), who incorporated the first empirical evidence that became available.
This section reviews the main arguments of those researchers and confronts pre-EMU
expectations with the latest available evidence. I first describe the direct, mechanical effects of
EMU, the sizes of which are of course specific to EMU and cannot be generalized to other
monetary union projects. I then focus on the indirect effects; i.e., the extent to which EMU
contributed to integrate the various segments of European financial markets.
It is important to consider that the data presented here for the period 1999–2001 will of course not
only reflect the impact of EMU, but also the impact of short-term events, such as the double crisis
of the Russian sovereign default and Long-Term Capital Management in the fall of 1998, or the
boom and slump of the “new economy,” which are unrelated to EMU but difficult to disentangle
from the data.
153.1 Direct effects
3.1.1 Costs of business adjustment
The direct costs of making the transition to a single currency (staff retraining, information-
technology adjustment, note-handling costs, etc.) were apparently modest in the European
securities industry. A frequently quoted study commissioned by the International Securities
Market Association (Scobie 1997) polled over 1,000 market participants and found estimates of
direct costs to range from European currency unit (ECU) 110,000 to ECU 8 million per firm; i.e.,
an average of 0.058 per cent of the total operating costs of financial institutions.
These figures are tiny compared with the estimates for the banking sector. Based on a survey of its
members in March 1995, the Banking Federation of the EU estimated the costs of conversion
(including the above-noted securities firms’ conversion costs) to be between ECU 8 and 10 billion.
This estimate must be considered low, because it does not allow for the fact that banks have to
keep accounts in both national currencies and the euro during the transition period from January
1999 to 2002. According to Salomon Brothers (1996), this implies added costs of about 1 to 1.5
per cent of total revenues per year over a three- to four-year period.
3.1.2 Standardization and transparency in pricing
The introduction of a single unit of account has standardized the expression of prices of financial
products and vastly simplified financial transactions. The resulting economies in transactions
costs make financial markets (and non-financial markets alike) more transparent, thus contributing
to the constitution of a single European capital market. According to Danthine, Giavazzi, and von
Thadden (2000), these direct gains consist mainly of the time saved comparing or posting prices
in several currencies and the value lost in suboptimal transactions by imperfectly informed
participants. Although these gains are probably important, it seems that no reliable estimate of
their size is available.
3.1.3 Shrinking of the foreign exchange market
The best way to gauge the overall economic gain caused by the shrinking of the foreign exchange
market is to assess the corresponding loss in currency exchange and arbitrage revenue among
EMU legacy currencies. Table 4 reports the average daily worldwide foreign exchange
transactions of major currencies for the years 1995, 1998, and 2001.
16The trading volume of $125 billion in daily foreign exchange transactions between EMU legacy
currencies, corresponding to 6.3 per cent of total global transactions, simply disappeared between
31 December 1998 and 1 January 1999.
Moreover, the drop in trade in U.S. dollars may also be partly attributable to EMU, since some of
the trade between euro legacy currencies used the U.S. dollar as vehicle currency; this trading
activity stopped with the advent of the euro as well.
If the trade volumes of foreign exchange transactions among EMU legacy currencies are weighted
by unit transaction costs (Hartmann 1997), we get a first impression of the economic gains
involved. Based on the BIS Triennial Report of 1995 (see Table 4), Salomon Brothers (1996)
estimated that net revenues derived from foreign exchange trading might fall by 10 to 15 per cent
per year, implying about a 1 per cent decline in total revenues for the banking system.
For the arbitrage business, Scobie (1997) reports that market participants have estimated that they
will lose up to 60 per cent of their European bond business and up to 30 per cent of their swap
business due to the elimination of the 10 different local currencies. These revenue losses represent
Table 4: Average Daily Worldwide Foreign Exchange Transactions
of Major Currencies (1995, 1998, and 2001)
Average daily turnover in 1995
(US$billions)
Average daily turnover
in 1998 (US$billions)
Average daily
turnover in 2001
Total Versus
US$
Versus
EMU
currencies
Total Versus
US$
Versus
EMU
currencies
Total Versus
US$
U.S. dollar 1,313.4 – 1,741.0 – 1,472.7 –
EMU
currencies
869.8 551.4 201.1 968.4 709.1 125.1
611.8 498.0
ECU 36.2 25.2 10.9 28.2 22.7 5.6
Japanese yen 371.4 329.9 407.2 363.3 369.57 325.46
British pound 139.7 102.8 211.9 159.4 207.4 170.01
Canadian
dollar
50.35 49.15 68.653 66.63 72.52 70.38
Total 1,571.8 1,313.4 1,981.6 1,741.0 1,617.9 1,472.7
Sources: Danthine, Giavazzi, and von Thadden (2000), Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2001).
Notes: Because the table reports the average daily turnover in which a given currency appears on one side of a
transaction, each currency is counted twice. The total (which also includes other currencies) is divided by two. In
the figures for 2001, “EMU currencies” and “ECU” are replaced by the euro.
17an overall economic gain, as the real resources that were used up in currency trading are now free
for more productive uses.
It is also interesting to compare the transactions volume of the Canadian dollar versus the U.S.
dollar with that between euro legacy countries. Note that the Can$/US$ average daily worldwide
turnover amounted to US$70 billion in 2001, of which roughly US$25 billion took place inside
Canada,14 which is almost one fifth of the intra-euro-area trade in 1998 (US$130 billion).
Considering the relative sizes of the economies involved, these figures are striking and point to
important potential efficiency gains for Canada from a NAMU.
3.1.4 Elimination of intra-European currency risk
As Danthine, Giavazzi, and von Thadden (2000) acknowledge, exchange rate risk had
traditionally been an important component of intra-European market risk, in particular for longer-
term contracts.
Based on the methods developed in an earlier study (De Santis and Gerard 1998), De Santis,
Gerard, and Hillion (1999) show that, in the 1990s, EMU countries’ currency risk was a
significant risk factor for investors, although it had declined over the decade. They also find that
non-EMU currency risk was quantitatively much larger, in particular the risk associated with the
U.S. dollar.
In shaping trade and investment patterns, the currency risk has considerable macroeconomic
implications. For equity markets, Fratzscher (2001) finds that, after controlling for real and
monetary policy convergence, exchange rate volatility still is very useful for explaining the
development of financial market integration. Higher exchange rate volatility among EU
currencies led to a lower degree of integration, particularly in France and Denmark, but also in
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
3.1.5 Homogenization of the private and public bond markets
As predicted by McCauley and White (1997), the euro created a single private yield curve across
the euro area. Except for shorter maturities, where interbank-offered rates are used, such national
private yield curves are constructed from the best rates on the fixed sides of interest-rate swap
14. In 2001, the total daily turnover of foreign exchange in Canada was US$41.6 billion; transactions that
had the U.S. dollar on one side amounted to US$40 billion, of which US$25 billion had the Canadian
dollar on the other side.
18contracts offered by banks in the country in question (Danthine, Giavazzi, and von Thadden
2000).
At the long end, national private reference rates had almost completely converged for Belgium,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands by mid-June 1996, reflecting the fact that market
participants attached a high probability to stable exchange rates among these currencies. Since
January 1999, the ECB has formally documented a private euro yield curve, derived from interest
rate swaps.
For shorter maturities, full convergence was achieved by mid-February 1997 (Danthine, Giavazzi,
and von Thadden 2000); meanwhile, EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average) and EURIBOR
(Euro Inter-Bank Offer Rate) are fully accepted as uniform price references by operators in this
market segment (European Commission 2001, 138).
For the public debt markets, the outlook for a euro yield curve is much more problematic.
Although some convergence in the yield spreads on government bonds could be observed since
the advent of the euro, the markets for euro-area government bonds remain segmented.15
Nonetheless, the euro has directly affected the structure of these markets. As early as 1995, the
EU governments had decided that, as of January 1999, all new fungible public debt by EMU
member states should be issued in euros. The question of how to proceed with the outstanding
debt still denominated in the legacy countries remained unsettled for a long time.
The French and Belgian governments opted very early in favour of redenomination, whereas the
German government had serious concerns about the costs and technical difficulties of such a
switch. Fear of losing the benchmark status to France was probably a decisive factor in the
German government’s decision, on 9 June 1998, to fully convert existing German fungible federal
debt by 1 January 1999.
In the wake of this decision, all remaining EMU countries followed suit, thus adding large
volumes to the long end of the yield curve as well as creating euro markets for shorter maturities
(see Danthine, Giavazzi, and von Thadden 2000).
15. See section 3.2.2 for a more detailed discussion and possible explanations for this segmentation.
193.2 Indirect effects
3.2.1 Cost of cross-country transactions within the EMU area
While the euro had important direct implications in decreasing transactions costs, it also
highlighted the remaining heterogeneities obstructing cross-border investment activities within
the euro area. In particular, cross-border clearing and settlement are substantially more expensive
and risky than domestic clearing and settlement. One symptom of this problem is the euro area’s
highly complex infrastructure: it has 18 large-value transfer systems, 23 securities-settlement
systems, and 13 retail-payments systems, compared with two large-value transfer systems, three
securities-settlement systems, and three retail-payments systems in the United States16 (Padoa-
Schioppa 1999).
The Giovannini Group of Financial Market Experts, formed in 1996 to advise the EC
Commission on issues relating to EU financial integration and the efficiency of euro-denominated
financial markets, recently examined the efficiency of current arrangements for clearing and
settlement of cross-border securities transactions in the EU. The Giovannini Group (2001) find
that per-transaction income (used as a proxy for settlement costs) of the International Central
Securities Depositories (ICSDs) in Europe, which process predominantly cross-border trades, is
about 8 to 10 times higher than per-transaction income of national CSDs, which process
predominantly domestic transactions (Table 5).
The Giovannini report also shows that European domestic settlement systems are comparable
with the U.S. or Swiss systems in terms of efficiency, suggesting that important economic gains
could be realized if the cost of cross-border transactions within the euro area were brought down
to domestic levels.
The Giovannini report identifies technical requirements, market practices, taxation, and legal
uncertainty as the main barriers to a more efficient settlement of cross-border payments within the
euro area. Although the report favours a market-driven restructuring as far as technical
requirements and market practices are concerned, it calls upon the public sector to remove fiscal
and legal obstacles.
16. A vast reorganization is underway and already well advanced in large-value transfer systems. By
contrast, securities-settlement systems have only just started to move, and the restructuring of retail-
payments systems is yet to come.
20Along these lines, an Economic and Financial Committee (2002) report recommends fast
implementation of the measures described in the Financial Services Action Plan, which addresses
issues such as cross-border use of collateral and use of clearing and central counterparty facilities
in other jurisdictions within the EU by market participants.
Banks face a similar situation. In a 1999 study by the ECB (see Danthine, Giavazzi, and von
Thadden 2000), it became evident that fees charged to customers by euro-area banks for domestic
credit transfer were considerably lower than for euro-area cross-border transactions (euro 0.10 to
0.15 for a domestic credit transfer independent of the amount transferred, compared with euro 3.5
to 26 for small amounts and between euro 31 and 400 for higher amounts transferred across the
border), and domestic payments would arrive at their destination much faster (usually 1 to 3 days)
than cross-border payments (which need 4.8 working days, on average). Little seems to have
changed since the publication of this study (see Padoa-Schioppa 2001).
The inception of the euro increased the visibility of the inefficiencies described above and
renewed pressure on politicians to adopt institutional reforms that foster harmonization and
efficiency in European financial markets. The first steps taken in this direction are the
establishment of TARGET and EURO1, the real-time gross settlement systems of the European
System of Central Banks and European Banking Association, and the implementation (in August
1999) of the Eur Directive 97/5/EC on cross-border credit transfer.
Table 5: Comparisons of Per-Transaction Income
Organization Operating
income (in euros)
Transactions
(post-meeting)
Operating income
per transaction
(in euros)
European ICSD Euroclear Bank 360,590,000 11,000,000 32.78
European ICSD Clearstream
Luxembourg
401,175,000 12,000,000 33.43
EU EU domestic and
internat’l CSDs
1,644,565,272 319,662,321 5.14
EU excl. ICSDs 882,800,272 296,662,321 2.98
Swiss ICSD SIS 103,231,065 17,745,900 5.82
U.S. CSD DTCC++ 638,261,727 230,271,931 2.77
Source: Giovannini Group (2001, 40).
213.2.2 Euro-denominated bond markets
By eliminating the currency risk and reducing transactions costs, EMU has contributed to the
creation of more homogeneous, liquid euro-area bond markets. The increase in transparency has
put traders in foreign euro-denominated assets on an equal risk base with domestic traders, who
can now focus on the less volatile risks, including credit, liquidity, settlement, legal, and event
risks (Prati and Schinasi 1997).
The greater liquidity and depth of the euro-denominated markets has been reflected in higher
issuance rates, in particular during 1999 and 2000. Figure 1 shows total euro-denominated bond
issuance for January 1999 until June 2002 by residency of issuers. Note that the abrupt jump in
January 2001 can be explained by the enlargement of the euro area to include Greece.
Figure 1: Total Euro-Denominated Bond Issuance by Residency of Issuer
The euro proved to be an attractive issuance currency for non-euro-area residents as well, in
particular for less-developed countries. Their share in total issuance remained at a fairly stable
level of 7 to 9 per cent during 1999 and 2000, dropped to 5 per cent during 2001, and reached
8 per cent again in mid-2002. Thus, the euro has emerged as the second most important currency
for international bond issuance, behind the U.S. dollar.
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22Moreover, the composition of bond issuance changed notably compared with before the
introduction of EMU. Figure 2 shows that, while the government remains the primary supplier of
bonds, there has been a sharp rise in non-sovereign issuance, with the combined issuance of the
corporate and financial sectors more than quadrupling since 1998.
Figure 2: The Composition of Euro-Denominated Bond Issuance
                          Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, April 2000, April 2001, March 2002, September 2002.
But the government bond market will be examined first. As Figure 3 shows, the public bond
markets remain fairly segmented. Yields did converge significantly during the run-up to the EMU,
which was in marked contrast to the situation that existed as recently as the mid-1990s. This
convergence in yields can be attributed to the elimination of exchange risk in the EMU and to the
relative improvement in budgetary conditions in several of the member states.
Since the end of 1998, however, yield spreads have widened again, showing that there is still
considerable fragmentation in this market segment, much of which reflects the fact that
government bonds are issued by 12 separate agencies with different needs, strategies, procedures,
and instruments (European Commission 2001). Of course, government bonds of different issuers
will not be perfect substitutes if there are substantial differences in credit risk and there is no
common liability for a sovereign’s debt; i.e., if the “no-bail-out” clause of the Maastricht Treaty
(Art. 104b) is considered as credible by market participants.
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23Figure 3: Yield Spreads on Government Bonds in the Euro Area
                         Source: The European Commission (2001, 140).
If we measure sovereign risk by a country’s credit rating,17 we can observe that a lower rating still
implies a higher cost of borrowing: as a country’s rating deteriorates by one grade, it must expect
an increase in yield of about 10 to 15 basis points. Differences in bond yields between countries
within the same ratings group vary considerably, however, indicating that differences in credit risk
do not fully explain the observed heterogeneity of government bond yields (e.g., 20 basis points
within the group of top-rated countries alone).
The most likely explanation, then, is that liquidity premia have emerged as an important
determinant of the euro-area government yield spreads; in fact, markets have traditionally
attached a higher liquidity risk to non-German public bonds than to German ones (which are
served by very liquid futures contracts, allowing for better hedging) (Danthine, Giavazzi, and von
Thadden 2000, 17).18
A possible response to this problem, which was considered by the Giovannini Group in 2000, is to
coordinate government debt issuance in the euro area, at least on technical aspects of issuance, if
not to establish a single benchmark issuer for the euro area as a whole (European Commission
17. Note that, as of September 2002, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s sovereign ratings coincide for all
EMU member countries except Spain.
18. Thus, the European experience contradicts Grubel (2000), who expects the Canadian-U.S. yield
spread to diminish to a negligible size in case of a NAMU.
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242001, 141).19 One concern associated with this proposal is that markets may interpret co-
operation as co-responsibility, an impression that the Maastricht Treaty seeks to avoid explicitly.
Just as for the public bond markets, it was expected that the elimination of the currency risk and
the reduction in transactions costs brought about by EMU would make the euro-area private bond
market more attractive both for borrowers and investors, thus contributing to the process of
disintermediation and securitization in Europe (see Prati and Schinasi 1997).
The actual development of the euro private bond market in 1999 still came as a big surprise.
Though some of this surge may reflect short-term effects, such as the release of pent-up demand,
the telecom boom, and the desire to set benchmarks with euro issues, 1999 marks a fundamental
switch of market behaviour on a truly European scale, with non-sovereign issuance (including the
financial sector) more than quadrupling (European Commission 2001, 138 ff.).
But not only did aggregate volumes increase dramatically; the size of the largest issues increased
substantially, with issues above 1 billion euros becoming more and more frequent. In addition, the
average rating of companies issuing bonds fell significantly: while almost 50 per cent of non-
sovereign issuance was still AAA in 1996, as much as 46 per cent of all corporate bonds issued in
the first three quarters of 1999 had a single A credit rating.20 The evidence also suggests that
cross-border ownership of corporate bonds increased substantially (Field, Humphreys, and
Sokolov 2000).
Because the dramatic increase in bond supply, in particular by non-residents, was the driving
force behind the expansion of the private bond market, this development was blamed for the weak
stance of the euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar during most of 1999 and 2000. This early
supply of euro bonds by non-euro-area residents, which clearly exceeded the euro-predecessor
currency aggregate, has actually been absorbed so far by euro-area residents and not by outside
investors (Detken and Hartmann 2000).
In 2000, the bond market experienced a trend decline in euro issuance, due to a return to a more
normal rhythm of issuing activity, reduced government borrowing needs, and a progressive
deterioration in market sentiment, whereas 2001 saw a renewed surge of issuance, particularly
during the first few months of the year.
19. Note that the euro government bond market is not expected to expand much on the supply side, as
governments try to cut deficits to meet the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact.
20. To date, no “EU junk bond market” has emerged that would be comparable with the U.S. junk bond
market, where outstanding bonds of non-investment-grade firms rose to over $200 billion in 1996,
equivalent to about one quarter of outstanding corporate bank loans.
25As new data become available, it is possible to analyze first trends emerging from the experience
of the last three years. De Bondt (2002) finds that the debt securities market is tapped by non-
financial corporations to fund their mergers and acquisitions, and investment or working capital
financing needs; substitution between debt securities and other sources of corporate finance (in
particular, banking) takes place, indirectly through financing cost differentials as well as directly.
The empirical relationship found between corporate bond spreads and economic activity may
capture the general degree of concern in the economy about credit risk.
3.2.3 European equity markets
By reducing the risk and information costs of European cross-border investment, EMU laid the
foundations for rebalancing portfolios towards assets that previously were too costly in terms of
the risk-return trade-off, thus improving the spread of fundamental risk in asset holdings.
It is well known, however, that the international diversification in equities has suffered from the
so-called “home bias”; i.e., the share of international equity in total equity holdings by domestic
investors has been much smaller than standard portfolio models predict.21 (Adler and Dumas
1983). For instance, introduction of the euro implied a de facto elimination of the so-called
“matching rule,” according to which pension funds and insurance companies in many EU
countries22 had to hold at least 80 per cent of their assets in the same currency as their liabilities
(which is usually the home currency). But, as Danthine, Giavazzi, and von Thadden (2000)
document, the 80 per cent rule was usually not a binding restriction in most EMU countries in the
early 1990s, which suggests that the introduction of the euro would not lead to an automatic
reallocation of institutional investment.23 This is consistent with the presumption that, so far,
reasons other than currency must have kept equity investors from investing abroad.
Yet, the picture seems to have changed in the mid-1990s, even though this may not necessarily be
due to EMU. For instance, the consolidation of European stock exchanges (e.g., the creation of
Euronext and Virt-x) must be seen as a global rather than an EU-specific phenomenon. Similarly,
the amazing performance of new-economy stock markets in the EU (e.g., Neuer Markt in
21. The most plausible explanation for the home-bias puzzle seems to be asymmetric information and
learning (see Gehrig 1993 and Hasan and Simaan 2000; for empirical analysis that lends support to the
information-based explanation, see Tesar and Werner 1995, and Portes, Rey, and Oh 2001). Applying
this argument to Europe, the lack of transparency and trading opportunities in continental European
firms, as well as the weakly developed equity culture of European investors, would explain the paucity
of equity flows into and out of Europe until the 1990s (Danthine, Giavazzi, and von Thadden 2000).
22. Including Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
23. For a detailed description of the European pension funds’ asset management, see Field, Humphreys,
and Sokolov (2000, 49–64).
26Frankfurt) in the period around the launch of the EMU, and their subsequent slump, reflected U.S.
developments (European Commission 2001, 143).
This performance is in line with Detken and Hartmann (2000), who find that the interest of global
fund managers in acquiring euro-denominated equity during 1998 was short-lived. For domestic
investors, however, Danthine, Giavazzi, and von Thadden (2000) document a visible upward
trend, for all European countries, in the share of foreign to total financial assets, which suggests a
gradual erosion of the home bias during the late 1990s. This is in line with Fratzscher (2001), who
employed a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model on the
uncovered asset return parity and found that European equity markets have become highly
integrated only since 1996, with EMU being the major force behind this development.24
At the same time, however, it seems that correlations of equity returns across most sectors in the
euro area have increased substantially, as Table 6 shows, which lists the average percentage
change in returns to a shock of 1 per cent from the euro area and the United States, respectively.
Table 6 shows that the responsiveness of equity returns in the single EMU countries to shocks
originating from the euro area increased markedly during the run-up to EMU (1993–98), and
again during the first two years of EMU, while the influence of shocks from the United States on
equity returns in the euro area seems to have decreased somewhat. The intensity of the effect
differed among the EMU countries: while France, Germany, Italy, and Finland seem to be closely
linked, the effect was felt less in Austria and Belgium.
Note also that the current responsiveness of Canadian equity returns to U.S. shocks is comparable
in size to the one that prevailed in the euro area during the run-up to EMU (0.535 versus 0.500).
24. Recall from section 3.1.4 the high importance that Fratzscher (2001) attributes to exchange rate
volatility in hindering equity market integration.
27The increase in correlations of equity returns across EMU countries implies that diversification
opportunities for investors are being reduced.25 This phenomenon is not restricted to intra-euro-
area correlations. Apparently, equity returns between the three major economic blocks—the euro
area, the United States, and Japan—experienced an increase in correlation during the late 1990s,
while the correlation of bond returns remained unchanged over the same period (Table 7).
Table 6: Average Percentage Change in Equity Returns to a Shock of
1 Per Cent From the Euro Area and United States, Respectively
Return spillovers from euro area Return spillovers from the U.S.
Subperiods Subperiods
1/86–
7/92
8/92–
7/93
8/93–
4/98
5/98–
6/00
1/86–
7/92
8/92–
7/93
8/93–
4/98
5/98–
6/00
Austria 0.119 0.224 0.313 0.364 0.095 0.270 0.322 0.210
Belgium 0.194 0.029* 0.373 0.547 0.275 0.252 0.305 0.214
Finland NA NA 0.665 1.096 NA NA 0.695 0.772
France 0.288 0.072* 0.576 0.918 0.308 0.335 0.411 0.352
Germany 0.389 0.293 0.385 0.995 0.375 0.365 0.573 0.399
Italy 0.282 0.137* 0.557 0.977 0.319 0.258* 0.321 0.294
Netherlands 0.062 -0.012* 0.419 0.827 0.367 0.345 0.495 0.402
Spain 0.162 0.227* 0.656 0.843 0.319 0.359 0.373 0.256
Euro area ** 0.270 0.160 0.500 0.911 0.321 0.317 0.439 0.345
Canada -0.062* 0.071* -0.101* 0.461 0.430 0.298 0.480 0.535
Source: Fratzscher (2001, 17 f.).
* Numbers are NOT significant at the 1 per cent level.
** Weighted averages of the estimated coefficients for the individual EMU countries, with the weights being
GDP shares.
25. Recall the discussion on the benefits of international risk-sharing in section 2.1.
283.2.4 The European banking sector
The direct effects of EMU on the banking sector (in terms of transition costs and loss of foreign
exchange revenue) were described briefly in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3. Another direct effect of the
euro is the elimination of the so-called “anchoring principle,” which was advocated by many
European central banks and required domestic financial institutions to lead-manage bond issues
(Prati and Schinasi 1997).
Moreover, the euro is expected to increase competitive pressures in the European banking
industry indirectly by altering bank customers’ attitudes (particularly on the wholesale level) and
attracting new competitors (e.g., U.S. and U.K. investment banks). This will accelerate the
process of disintermediation (in the sense that borrowers and investors turn away from banks to
meet directly on capital markets), which already started with the surprising surge of corporate
bond issuance documented in section 3.2.2.26
Considering the efforts to create a single market for financial services in the EU (the Single
European Act of 1986, Second Banking directive of 1989, and Investment Services Directive of
1993), and the poor performance of European banks in terms of costs and revenues (see Prati and
Schinasi 1997), it is surprising that European banks have not restructured and consolidated earlier.
Table 7: Correlation of Bond Equity Returns across Markets
U.S. Germany (EURO) Germany (EURO)/Japan U.S./Japan
Bonds Equities Bonds Equities Bonds Equities
Correlations
without currency
Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly
1995–98 0.20 0.60 0.24 0.53 0.18 0.03 0.28 0.51 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.40
1998 0.29 0.62 0.43 0.72 0.23 0.22 0.29 0.49 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.54
1999 0.15 0.50 0.39 0.80 0.20 0.10 0.30 0.57 0.02 0.27 0.06 0.67
Source: Detken and Hartmann (2000, 51).
26. Unlike U.S. banks, European banks played a dominant role in firm financing, not only for short-term
but also for long-term maturities. In 2002, non-financial corporates were mainly financed through
quoted shares and bank loans, with two thirds of the latter being of long-term maturity. While EU
countries differ significantly in the size of the financial sector and in the relative role played by bank
loans vs. stock markets, financing through debt securities has gained some importance only since
1999. For more details, see Thiel (2001, 7–13).
29One plausible explanation for this fact is that the European banking system is still characterized
by strong legal and supervisory constraints and a high degree of state involvement, which tends to
shelter banks against competitive pressures and helps them reap economic rents.27 Another
possible explanation is the importance of the home-country relationship of banks, particularly
with their retail customers.
There are several ways in which banks can adapt to the new situation. First, they can try to cut
costs and improve productivity (thus taking advantage of recent technological progress; e.g.,
through electronic banking), which is difficult given the protective labour legislation and political
dimension of the banking business in most European countries (see McCauley and White 1997).
A second possibility is to restore profit margins by taking on more risk. Such behaviour may raise
concerns in terms of the stability of the financial system, and hence may not be considered
desirable (see Carletti and Hartmann 2001).28
The third option, to which many banks have turned over the past decade, is mergers and
acquisitions, and, more generally, the pursuit of cross-border alliances. To date, these mergers
have been mainly domestic, with cross-border mergers still being the exception (see Field,
Humphreys, and Sokolov 2000 for a detailed description).
To summarize, it seems unlikely that the introduction of the euro had more than a marginal direct
effect on the structure of the European banking system, but by squeezing bank profits it may have
given an important stimulus to the necessary restructuring in the banking industry. Its indirect
effects may thus be comparable with those of the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act, which removed the
interstate banking restrictions in the United States, thus vastly intensifying the reorganization of
the U.S. banking market in the 1990s.
3.2.5 The euro as an international transaction and reserve currency
Before entering into the third stage of EMU, many observers were expecting the euro to attain the
status of an international currency rivalling the dollar.29 Currency hegemony comes with
considerable advantages for the hegemon, in particular through seigniorage gains. According to
Alogoskoufis, Portes, and Rey (1997), 50 to 60 per cent of the total stock outstanding of U.S. currency
and 25 per cent of the total stock of U.S. government securities are being held by non-residents;
27. A recent striking example of anticompetitive behaviour in a nationally segmented market is the case of
the Austrian banking system, which, in June 2002, was found guilty of coordinating interest rates and
fined 124.26 million euros, the sixth-highest fine in the history of the EU antitrust authority.
28. Recall the discussion of systemic risk and risk management in a currency union in section 2.3.1.
29. See Prati and Schinasi (1997) for a more skeptical assessment.
30this allows the United States to finance balance-of-payments deficits at no charge or at a
substantial liquidity premium worth 0.2 per cent of GDP per year.
Alogoskoufis, Portes, and Rey (1997) develop several scenarios for the internationalization of the
euro, pointing out the crucial role of transactions costs in foreign exchange and securities markets
as well as the network externalities associated with the use of an international currency. They
predict that the most likely scenario would be coexistence of the euro and U.S. dollar as
international currencies, with the euro replacing the dollar as the dominant currency for
exchanges between Europe and the Asian bloc, but the dollar still being the vehicle currency on
the foreign exchange markets and the dominant reserve currency.
In terms of welfare, they concluded that if, in the long run, the euro could replace the U.S. dollar
as the main international currency for financial asset transactions and take the role of vehicle
currency on the foreign exchange markets, this would be associated with a gain (as flow) of
0.2 per cent in GDP for Europe, and a loss of 0.04 per cent and 0.07 per cent of GDP for the
United States and Japan, respectively. The gains for Europe would come mainly from decreasing
costs on the bond markets, while the losses for the United States and Japan would come from
foreign exchange market transactions: both countries are better off when the dollar is the vehicle
currency.30
The actual development of the international role of the euro was much closer to the more
conservative scenario described above. After the first year of EMU, the emergence of the euro’s
international role was regarded as “normal” from what could have been expected before its
introduction; while the euro gained importance quickly as a store of value, its role as an
international medium of exchange was still very limited (Detken and Hartmann 2000).
According to the ECB (2001), the euro does not play a role comparable with that of the U.S.
dollar as a vehicle currency in the foreign exchange market and as a pricing and quotation
currency.
As a reserve currency, at the end of 1999 the euro accounted for 12.5 per cent of the foreign
exchange reserve assets of IMF Member States, thus being the second world reserve currency,
behind the U.S. dollar (66.2 per cent) and ahead of the Japanese yen (5.1 per cent).31 Apparently,
30. Alogoskoufis, Portes, and Rey (1997) also point out that, from an aggregate point of view, world
welfare is not maximized in either of these scenarios, but rather in a situation where the euro replaces
the dollar as the main international currency for financial asset transactions, while the dollar remains
the vehicle currency on the foreign exchange markets.
31. Compare this statistic with the numbers for 1997: U.S. dollar 62.1 per cent, Yen 5.3 per cent, Deutsche
Mark 12.6 per cent.
31the introduction of the euro did not cause aggregate reallocation of official reserves outside the
euro area.
As an anchor and intervention currency, the euro plays some role in the exchange rate regime of
56 countries outside the euro area (mainly Eastern European, Mediterranean, and African
countries); solutions adopted range from very strict links—or even full pegging—to the euro to
looser forms of anchoring.
This use of the euro as anchor and intervention currency reflects in large part the role some legacy
currencies played before the introduction of the euro; for example, the French franc in Africa and
the Deutsche Mark in Eastern Europe. Note also that from the three EU member countries that did
not introduce the euro (the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark), only Denmark decided to
peg its currency to the euro. Most Eastern European candidates for entry into the EU, such as
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, opted for a managed
floating arrangement with the euro as a reference currency.
4. Lessons for Canada
Caution is advised when drawing lessons from the European experience for other currency union
projects. NAMU would differ in many respects from EMU.
First, NAMU would involve a maximum of three countries (rather than 12 for EMU). Moreover,
the U.S. and Canadian financial markets are already more integrated than the EU member
countries: recall from Table 6 that the equity-return spillovers from the United States to Canada
today are comparable in size to the spillovers from the (future) euro area to its members during
the run-up to the EMU from 1993 to 1998 (Fratzscher 2001, 18).32
This confirms earlier results, for instance Paraskevopoulos, Paschakis, and Smithin (1996) and
Afxentiou and Serletis (1993); the latter find that the correlation between domestic investment and
savings in Canada is not as high as in other cross-section studies of industrial countries, which
indicates that there has been substantial international capital mobility in the Canadian economy.
As discussed in section 2.1, financial market integration has important implications for the
absorption of asymmetric shocks. We saw that international risk-sharing within the EU plays only
a minor role: roughly 80 per cent of idiosyncratic shocks are unsmoothed (Melitz and Zumer
32. This is not meant to imply that the Canadian and U.S. stock markets are integrated, as highlighted by
Ewing, Payne, and Sowell (1999).
321999). Compared with this number, the evidence of Canadian-U.S. risk-sharing appears to be
much more favourable.
As discussed in section 2.1.2, Antia, Djoudad, and St-Amant (1999) show that there is much more
consumption smoothing across Canada and the United States than across Europe (52 per cent
versus 24 per cent), with the dominant channel of risk-sharing being international borrowing and
lending. For North America, this implies that potential welfare gains that originate from any
further financial market integration (as encouraged, for instance, by a monetary union) may be
more moderate than in Europe.
Those in favour of NAMU claim that a monetary union with the United States would be
preferable to the unilateral dollarization of the Canadian economy (for instance, see Courchene
and Harris 2000, and Chriszt 2000),33 and they argue two points to support their claim.
First, unilateral dollarization would result in a loss of seigniorage, while, under a monetary union,
the Bank of Canada would continue to receive seigniorage that would accrue to the Canadian
government (Grubel 2000). The seigniorage revenue of a country under a monetary union,
however, need not correspond to its share in the money base and thus to the seigniorage that the
country would have raised had it not joined the monetary union.
Under EMU, the production of bills and coins, and therefore seigniorage profits, are pooled. The
ECB’s profits are distributed among its shareholders (the central banks of EMU-participating
countries) in proportion to their paid-up shares in the ECB’s capital. These shares are, of course,
fairly arbitrary and do not necessarily reflect the share in the euro money base of that specific
country. As a result, countries such as France and Portugal benefit greatly from this system, while
Germany and Spain lost substantial parts of their seigniorage after the introduction of the euro.
The second point argued against unilateral dollarization is that monetary policy in the region
would be determined solely by the actions of the U.S. Federal Reserve, which would not take the
needs of the Canadian economy into account.34 In other words, the unavoidable trade-off between
gains from coordination and loss of national sovereignty seems to be more favourable for Canada
under a monetary union.
33. In contrast to these authors, who maintain that dollarization of the Canadian economy would be an
ongoing and well-advanced process, Murray and Powell (2002) show that there is no evidence to
support this claim. Instead, they find that the Canadian dollar continues to be used as the principal unit
of account, medium of exchange, and store of value within Canadian borders, and there is no
indication that dollarization is likely to take hold in the foreseeable future.
34. Canada’s influence on the Fed’s monetary policies would remain marginal even in the case of a full-
fledged monetary union, with Canada (and Mexico) holding at most one seat on the FOMC.
33This argument highlights an important difference between EMU and NAMU: unlike the EU, the
United States and Canada do not have common political institutions, and are not likely to have
them in the near future (see Buiter 1999).
5. Conclusion
This paper has reviewed both the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of monetary
unions on financial markets, and evaluated the first three years of EMU in this respect.
If we assume that multiple currencies prevent national financial markets from integrating, a
currency union can improve welfare in two ways. First, agents will be encouraged to diversify
their portfolios internationally, thus obtaining decentralized insurance against asymmetric shocks
to their income. The evidence shows that idiosyncratic shocks are larger, and smoothing is lower,
internationally relative to nationally, and that a large share of international risk-sharing is due to
diversified property holdings in the European case, and to cross-border borrowing and lending in
the U.S.-Canadian case.
Second, financial integration can foster growth by enhancing the quality of investment, and by
encouraging riskier and more long-term investment. Empirically, there seems to be a consensus
about the strong impact of financial development on growth for developing countries, while the
evidence for industrial countries remains inconclusive.
Although financial integration has developed significantly in the EU over the past 10 years, there
is no doubt that European financial markets are still fairly segmented along national borders. With
recent estimates of potential welfare gains of 0.5 to 0.7 per cent of EU GDP per year, financial
market integration was assigned a high priority on the EU economic reform agenda adopted in
2000.
While public policies can contribute to encouraging financial integration, integrated financial
markets can have important feedback effects on public policies themselves. By homogenizing
financial structures, integration affects the likelihood of systemic crises as well as the
effectiveness of some of the policy instruments (namely, the transmission mechanisms) deployed
to manage those crises.
The experiences that European financial markets have had introducing the euro shows that
monetary union can indeed provide an important stimulus towards financial integration, both
directly and indirectly.
34First, the introduction of EMU implied that all foreign exchange trade between the euro legacy
countries simply became redundant. In 1998, the last year before EMU took effect, this trade
amounted to an average daily turnover of roughly US$130 billion. Moreover, intra-European
currency risk, which played an important role in shaping trade and investment patterns, was
eliminated.
Along with a certain homogenization of issuance practices in the public bond markets, these
direct effects of EMU helped remove obstacles that had shaped European trade and investment
patterns, thus promoting the integration of European financial markets.
The stimulus caused by EMU was reflected differently in various financial markets. The European
corporate bond market expanded dramatically during the first months of EMU, although the
strong increase in supply seemed to dominate for some time, a situation that was blamed for the
initially weak stance of the euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.
While the European corporate bond market can be considered fully integrated, the European
government bond markets are still somewhat segmented. The most likely explanation for the
persistence of yield spreads among different national issuers is the importance of sovereign credit
risk and liquidity premia.
If high equity-return correlations can be considered as evidence of deep integration, then the
integration of European equity markets has certainly made substantial progress, although the
phenomenon was not restricted to the euro area alone; higher return correlation also implies less
opportunities for diversification.
Apart from initial adjustment costs and the loss of some sources of revenue, the European banking
sector was probably only marginally affected by EMU. Still, EMU may have contributed
indirectly to increasing competitive pressures in this sector, as certified by the remarkable
consolidation efforts in that industry.
What can we infer from the European experience for a potential NAMU? First, it seems that the
U.S. and Canadian financial markets are already more integrated than were the European ones
immediately before the introduction of the euro. This implies that potential welfare gains
originating from any further financial market integration (as encouraged, for instance, by a
monetary union) may be more moderate than in the European case.
Finally, it has been argued in favour of NAMU that a monetary union with the United States
would be preferable to the unilateral dollarization of the Canadian economy. This argument
highlights an important difference between EMU and NAMU: unlike in the EU, the United States
and Canada do not have common political institutions, and are not likely to have them in the near
future.
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